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This paper investigates how different commodity prices are affected by unconventional monetary
policies (UMP) implemented by the Federal Reserve of the United States as a response to the Global
Financial Crisis. We analyze impulse responses using local projections proposed by Jordà (2005)
and follow Swanson (2017)’s identification strategy for UMP shocks. We show that forward guid-
ance (FG) and large-scale asset purchase (LSAP) shocks lead to distinct responses from commodity
prices. We find that asset-like commodities, such as gold and silver, respond to these UMP shocks
most aggressively. While an easing FG shock leads to increases in their prices, an easing LSAP
shock has the opposite effect. This differential response suggests that these asset-like commodities
are being used as inflation and exchange rate hedges. In contrast, production-like and agricultural
commodities respond to UMP shocks in the same way as conventional monetary policy shocks.
Consistent with previous literature, we find that easing LSAP shocks, to some extent, signal a neg-
ative economic outlook. Policymakers can exploit these different commodities when evaluating the
effectiveness of monetary policy in different sectors of the economy.
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1. Introduction
Before the onset of the Global Financial Crisis, central banks around the world typically used open
market operations as the main operating procedure for monetary policy. During normal times, one
could view an easing of monetary policy as either a decline in short-term interest rates or as an expan-
sionary open market operation that increases the money supply. However, after reducing the policy
interest rate close to zero by the end of 2008, the Federal Reserve had very limited capacity to stim-
ulate the economy using conventional tools. As a result, the Federal Reserve, among other central
banks, started to implement unconventional monetary policies (UMPs) as a way to stimulate the econ-
omy. In the United States, these non-standard monetary policies included forward guidance (FG), a
situation where the central bank communicates the state of the economy and likely future course of
monetary policy. The central bank also implemented large scale asset purchases (LSAPs) programs,
which involves the purchase of assets that are not traditionally present in its portfolio.1 Since these
unconventional monetary tools were implemented, the literature has tried to quantify the impact of
these policies on economic activity and financial markets.2 Much less attention, however, has been paid
to the consequences of these policies on commodities. This paper adds to this literature.
Analyzing the effects of UMPs on commodities can be quite informative as they capture different
sectors of the economy. Some commodities (raw materials) are important inputs to the production
process of different sectors in the economy. Thus, these commodities provide insights on how these
policies affect industrial activity. Other commodities (agricultural products) reflect parts of house-
holds’ consumption basket, and hence capture how the demand side reacts to UMPs. Finally, other
commodities, such as gold and silver, are part of the households’ financial portfolios. As a result, one
can gather complementary information regarding the evolution of financial markets once UMPs are an-
nounced and implemented. Thus, by separately considering these different types of commodities, we
can quantify the impact of UMPs on parts of the real economy as well as financial markets. We derive
1The Federal Reserve bought an unprecedented large amount of public debt of much longer maturities, as well as private
mortgage backed securities.
2The effect of UMPs on financial markets has been studied extensively in the literature (see Neely, 2015; Swanson, 2017,
and reference therein).
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the impulse responses using local projections proposed by Jordà (2005) and employ the high-frequency
identification strategy of Swanson (2017) to disentangle three monetary policy shocks. By focusing
on changes in commodity prices in a narrow window after each unconventional monetary policy an-
nouncement, we can isolate their effects on commodity prices. The motivation of such an empirical
strategy is that rational agents trading in commodity markets incorporate all public and relevant infor-
mation, which are reflected in prices. Thus, price changes shortly after a UMP announcement can help
us evaluate how this new information is perceived by producers, consumers, and investors, depending
on what type of commodities we examine. In contrast, to have a clean identification, lower-frequency
time series analyses should control for other factors affecting prices directly. Using such identification
to perform an impulse response analysis, allows us to capture the instantaneous effect of such policies
and provide an estimate of the persistence of UMP shocks.
We find that asset-like commodities, such as gold and silver, respond to the UMP shocks most ag-
gressively. An easing LSAP shock leads to drops in gold and silver prices. However, the equity market
has an opposite response to the same shock. This differential reaction between asset-like commodities
and equity suggests that these precious metals are used as a hedge against equity market risk. Interest-
ingly, an easing FG shock leads to increases in the price of gold both before and during the zero lower
bound (ZLB) period. For silver, we find similar results, but only during the ZLB period. These findings
suggest two possible channels through which such response operates. The first is the inflation expecta-
tion channel, whereby an easing FG shock (represented by lower long-run interest rate) increases future
inflation expectations. Hence, in this situation, precious metals can be used as an inflation hedge. The
second one is the exchange rate channel, where lower long-run interest rate makes the US dollar less
attractive relative to foreign investments. Under such circumstances, precious metals can be used as a
hedge against US dollar depreciation risk.
For production and agricultural commodities, the effects of UMPs are similar to those found under
conventional monetary policies prior to the global financial crisis. We show that in most cases, the
price of production and agricultural commodities rises in response to an easing UMP shock. This is
consistent with a situation where households and firms see an easing UMP as a way to stimulate the
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economy. Hence households increase consumption, leading to more production. As a result, prices
of production-like commodities rise in the long-run. Our results are consistent with the findings of
Frankel (2006), Hammoudeh et al. (2015), Scrimgeour (2014) and Alam and Gilbert (2017). Unlike these
studies we employ high frequency identification with three policy shocks on individual commodity
prices rather than a commodity index.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the literature.
Section 3 reviews the key events during the period when UMPs were enacted, and describes the data
on commodity prices and the identification of monetary policy shocks. Section 4 investigates the effect
of UMPs on commodity prices. Finally, Section 5 summarizes our findings and concludes.
2. Literature
This paper connects with two strands of literature: one that studies the impact of unconventional
monetary policies on financial markets, and the other that examines how monetary policies affect
commodity prices.
There has been a growing body of literature investigating the effects of UMPs on financial markets
and the real economy.3 Earlier work focuses on how LSAPs change the medium and long-term interest
rates and Treasury yields. Prominent examples include Gagnon et al. (2011), D’Amico and King (2013),
Krishnamurthy et al. (2011), Wright (2012) and Swanson and Williams (2014), which mostly examine
the first two rounds of LSAP. The majority of studies consistently find that long-term interest rates
and Treasury yields fall in response to easing UMP shocks. However, Swanson and Williams (2014)
briefly discuss the notion that the Fed’s forward guidance and LSAP could lead to different effects for
intermediate and longer maturity treasury yields. Within this spirit, Swanson (2017) extends Swanson
and Williams (2014) in two respects. First, the author uses a novel approach to extract the first few
principal components across the term structure to identify two separate UMP shocks; namely, the FG
and the LSAP shocks.4 Second, in addition to Treasury bond yields, Swanson (2017) also examines
3Bhattarai and Neely (2016) offer a comprehensive and excellent review of existing studies on this topic.
4This high frequency identification strategy follows Gürkaynak et al. (2017).
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the effects of UMP shocks on equity, exchange rates, and corporate bonds.5 The author finds that FG
was more effective than LSAPs at moving short-term Treasury yields, while LSAPs were more effective
than forward guidance and the federal funds rate at moving longer-term Treasury and corporate bond
yields.
Other authors have also analyzed the impact of UMPs implemented by other central banks. For
instance, Bowman et al. (2015a) and Joyce et al. (2011) discuss the quantitative easing program of the
Bank of Japan and the Bank of England, respectively. Although the Bank of Japan’s reserve injections
boosted bank liquidity significantly, much of the effect was offset as banks reduced their lending to
each other. For the United Kingdom, the authors find that quantitative easing significantly lowered
government bond yields by around 50 or so basis points. When international spillover effects of Fed’s
UMPs are considered, Bauer and Neely (2014) and Neely (2015) find that the jump depreciation of
the US dollar is fairly consistent with estimates of the impacts of previous equivalent monetary policy
shocks. The policy announcements do not appear to have reduced yields by reducing expectations
of real growth. The authors also find that unconventional policy can reduce international long-term
yields and the value of the dollar, even at the ZLB.
The literature studying the effects of UMPs on commodity markets is much smaller. Existing re-
search on commodity markets usually only consider composite indices instead of individual commod-
ity price series (Hammoudeh et al., 2015; Amatov and Dorfman, 2017; Glick and Leduc, 2012; Hayo
et al., 2012). In contrast, Zhu et al. (2018) and Papadamou and Sogiakas (2018) examine how the UMP
implemented by the Bank of England, Bank of Japan, and the European Central Bank (ECB) affects the
prices of gold and silver. Their results show that the effects of UMPs are country-specific. Scrimgeour
(2014) also examines the effects of monetary policy surprises on individual commodity prices prior to
the ZLB period. The empirical findings on how the commodity market responds to the UMP shocks
are divided. Some studies, such as Frankel (2006); Scrimgeour (2014); Amatov and Dorfman (2017);
Hammoudeh et al. (2015), find that an easing monetary policy, represented by lower interest rate or
higher level of money supply, leads to increase in commodity price indices. In contrast, Glick and
5Other studies focus on financial markets include Neely (2015), Kiley (2014).
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Leduc (2012) show that commodity prices tend to fall in response to an easing LSAP announcement.6
Moreover, they find that positive US monetary surprises led to declines in commodity prices, even
as long-term interest rates fell and the US dollar depreciated. In contrast, on days of negative US
monetary surprises, commodity prices tended to increase.
3. Data
To analyze the impact of UMPs on commodities prices, we require data on policy announcements,
commodity prices, and monetary policy shocks. Below we provide information regarding the various
time series and dates of different monetary policy actions.
3.1. Policy Announcements
We first review the major monetary policy announcements since the Zero Lower Bound was in place,
and unconventional monetary policies were implemented. These range from November 2008 to De-
cember 2014. All dates and event descriptions are sourced from the Federal Reserve website (www.
federalreserve.gov) and reconciled with Kozicki et al. (2011), Fawley and Neely (2013), Bowman
et al. (2015b) and Swanson (2017). This information is summarized in Table 1.
*** TABLE 1 HERE ***
Since we use a high-frequency identification strategy to estimate the structural UMP shocks, these
dates are going to be crucial in helping us measure the effects of UMP announcements on commodity
prices.
3.2. Commodities
We consider three different commodity types. The first group is referred to as asset-like and includes
gold and silver. Although the prominent role of gold has declined among central banks since the
6These authors use an event study approach to investigate the changes in a range of Goldman Sachs commodity indices
during the first two rounds of LSAP.
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collapse of Bretton Woods in the early 1970s, it is still an important asset for households’ and central
banks’ portfolios. This is the case as gold is a store of value and a hedge against different types of
risk and uncertainty. In times of financial distress, investors rebalance their portfolios by reducing
their exposure to risky assets. This cross-market hedging strategy is sometimes referred to as a flight-
to-safety (flight-to-quality). The literature has identified gold as a dollar hedge (Zagaglia and Marzo,
2013), as an inflation hedge (Zhu et al., 2018), as a hedge for stock market crises (Hood andMalik, 2013),
or as a hedge for sovereign crises. Similar properties are also found for silver but to a lesser extent.
Thus, prices of asset-like commodities reflect their fundamental value as well as the value associated
with the alternative use as a financial asset to hedge various risks.
The second group of commodities is denoted as production-like. These include palladium, platinum,
and copper. These commodities are typically used as inputs in different sectors of the economy. Pal-
ladium has numerous applications in industrial production, including car manufacturing, electronics,
medicine, chemical applications, among its many other uses. Similar to palladium, platinum is also
heavily used for vehicle emission control devices, electrical applications, and chemical production. In
addition, due to its scarcity and resistance to corrosion, platinum is more widely used than palladium
in jewelry making. The major applications of copper are electrical wire (60%), roofing and plumbing
(20%), and industrial machinery (15%).7 These production-like commodities contain information regard-
ing real productive activities. Finally, the last group of commodities is referred to as agricultural, which
captures elements of the households’ consumption basket. In this latter group, we consider cocoa in
the benchmark analysis, and corn, soybean, and wheat for robustness analysis due to their shorter
sampling period.
For each of these commodity types, we collect daily price data from 1st January 1991 to 30th June
2016. Gold and silver prices represent the London fixing price at London Bullion Market Association
(LBMA).8 Prices are set per troy ounce and are in US dollar. Copper prices represent daily transactions
of Grade A Copper at the London Metal Exchange (LME) in US dollar per Metric Tonne. The LMBA
Platinum and Palladium prices are the fixing price in US dollar from London Platinum and Palladium
7https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Copper#Applications
8These are considered as the international standard for the pricing of gold and silver.
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Market, which is also administered by LME. Cocoa is transacted at International Cocoa Organization
(ICCO) and is denominated in US dollar per Metric Tonne. The choice of commodities examined in
this paper is driven by their data availability.
3.3. Monetary Policy Shocks
To identify monetary policy shocks, we use the methodology developed by Swanson (2017). More
precisely, the author extracts a number of asset prices on 213 Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
announcement days from July 1991 to October 2015.9 It is commonly accepted that the interest rate
futures and Treasury yields are highly responsive to changes in monetary policy. Hence only price
changes within the 30-minute window around the FOMC announcement time are considered.10 The
first three principal components are extracted from these eight series of 30-minute asset price changes
to identify monetary policy shocks. These are then mapped into the Federal Funds Rate (FFR), FG,
and LSAP shocks. The identification assumptions used by Swanson (2017) are as follows. The first
restriction is that LSAPs shocks do not affect the federal funds rate contemporaneously. The second
assumption is that FG shocks do not affect federal funds rates contemporaneously. Hence the FG shock
is defined as surprises to the future path of short-term interest rates over and above surprises to the
federal funds rate itself. Lastly, the LSAP shock is minimized before the ZLB period. The three iden-
tification restrictions combined, lead to a unique rotation of the first three principal components. In
addition to this full-sample identification, Swanson (2017) also implements a split-sample identifica-
tion, assuming there are only two factors (FFR and FG shocks) before the ZLB period, and two factors
(FG and LSAP shocks) during the ZLB period. The empirical results obtained using the split-sample
identification are qualitatively similar to the benchmark case. Hence we only discuss the monetary
policy shocks identified using the full-sample scheme in the following analyses.
*** FIGURE 1 HERE ***
9These include 1-month and 3-month federal funds futures, 2-quarter, 3-quarter and 4-quarter ahead Eurodollar futures,
and 2-year, 5-year, and 10-year Treasury yields. These eight assets do not contain any overlapping contracts in order to avoid
high correlation by construction.
10The 30-minute window starts from 10-minute before the announcement, and finishes at 20-minute after the announce-
ment.
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The three structural shocks identified by Swanson (2017) are plotted in Figure 1. These shocks are
normalized such that positive (negative) values represent a tightening (easing) in monetary policy. As
we can see, the FFR shock is negligible after December 16, 2008, when the FOMC cut the federal funds
rate to 0-0.25% and reached the ZLB. Moreover, the effect attributed to FG shock dramatically increased
on the same day. It is also worth noting that the largest LSAP factor occurred on March 18th 2009, which
corresponds to the announcement by the Federal Reserve of large purchases in Treasury bills and
mortgage backed securities. The correlations among these three structural shocks are essentially zero
as they are extracted from orthogonal principal components. There are very weak serial correlations
but mostly insignificant up to the 12th order. We refer the reader to Swanson (2017) for more detailed
discussions on the identification schemes and some summary statistics of the identified shocks.
4. Empirical Strategy
In order to provide some evidence that links FOMC announcements and their impact on the real
economy and financial markets, we use two different approaches. We first consider structural breaks
in the price series of the various commodities, and match them with the key monetary policy events.
We then estimate impulse responses of high frequency commodity prices to the monetary policy shocks
of interest using local projections proposed by Jordà (2005).
4.1. Structural Break Tests
We first examine whether commodity prices react to the various policy announcements by testing for
breaks in each of the price series. In particular, we estimate the dates of structural breaks in commodity
prices July 1, 2008 to June 30, 2016, identified by four commonly used tests due to Carrion-i Silvestre
et al. (2005), Lee and Strazicich (2003), Bai and Perron (2003) and Lumsdaine and Papell (1997), and
match them with days of key monetary policy announcements as listed in Table 1. Table 1 includes
all the major announcements between November 2008 and December 2014, including speeches made
by the Fed’s Chairman Ben Bernanke, such as the ones made in Austin, Jackson Hole, and Boston,
along with the major FOMC announcements. This yields 51 major communication signals between
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July 1, 2008, to December 31, 2014, which we match with our structural break dates. While there were
more than 55 FOMCmeetings during this period, a few of them did not release much new information.
Hence, our table includes almost all announcements except these few. For this type of analysis, we need
to define a proximity measure associated with the break test. We can then determine, by looking at the
various dates, whether commodity prices were impacted by policy announcements. The window we
use is seven days before or after each announcement. Dates before announcements capture anticipation
effects by market participants. The results of the various break tests and dates of policy announcements
are reported in Table 2.
*** TABLE 2 HERE ***
As Table 2 shows, the majority of the structural breaks in commodity prices happened during
the second stage of the LSAP program, and during the period between May 2013 and April 2015.
Furthermore, most of the breaks in commodity prices were observed after the announcement dates.
This suggests that the anticipation effect by market participants was less pronounced. It is also worth
noting that out of all commodities, most of the breaks that coincide with policy announcements are
associated with asset-like commodities. This is not too surprising as financial assets quickly reflect
additional information in their prices when compared to other types of commodities that are more
directly linked to real activity. For example, almost all of the break dates for gold occur immediately
after the policy announcements. This highlights the important role of gold as a hedging instrument.
Our break results provide some preliminary and suggestive evidence that FOMC announcements have
a substantial influence on commodity prices. Moreover, responses commodities of different types
respond differently to the various policy announcements.
4.2. Impulse Response Analysis
We follow Swanson (2017) and examine the persistence of the effects of various monetary shocks on
commodity prices. Therefore, in addition to the immediate responses, we are also interested in the
dynamic effects of different UMP shocks on commodity prices. An impulse response analysis enables
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us to capture the follow-through of the complete response paths of commodity prices. The impulse
responses are estimated using the local projections proposed by Jordà (2005). The baseline model is
given by
log yt−1+h = β0 + β1 log yt−1 + φ1,hεFFR,t + φ2,hεFG,t + φ3,hεLSAP,t + ut,h, (1)
where yt denotes the commodity price on announcement day t, h represents the day after the an-
nouncement for the 3 monetary policy shocks, εFFR, εFG and εLSAP. The effects of these structural
shocks on commodity prices are captured by coefficients φi,h, i = 1, 2, 3 for h = 1, 2, . . . , 60. Clearly
for h = 1 the estimated coefficient φi,1 captures the instantaneous effect of shock i on the price of the
commodity.
This local projection method proposed by Jordà (2005) is an alternative way of estimating impulse
responses relative to a structural vector autoregressive model (SVAR). As shown in equation (1), it
essentially uses direct multi-step forecasting at each horizon h. In sharp contrast, the structural VAR
approach uses iterated forecasting calculated from the estimated VAR coefficients, which is only opti-
mized for one-step ahead forecasting. In addition, VAR usually only represents a linear approximation
of the true data generating process (DGP), such approximation errors can be compounded with fore-
cast errors in long horizons, leading to inaccurate estimates of the corresponding impulse responses.
The main advantage of the local projection method is that we don’t need to specify and estimate the
underlying multivariate dynamics to obtain the impulse responses. Hence it is more robust to mis-
specification. Jordà (2005) also established the consistency and asymptotic normality of the impulse
responses estimated using local projections. The interval estimates are obtained using heteroskedastic-
ity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors, as the residual from the local projection (1)
is a moving average of the forecast errors. Other applications and discussions of local projections can
be found in Jordà et al. (2013); Ramey and Zubairy (2018); Stock and Watson (2018), among others.
4.2.1. Instantaneous Effects
Since break tests suggested that FOMC announcements had some larger effects on asset-like commodi-
ties, we also analyze the S&P500 index as a benchmark comparison. It is worth highlighting that in
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addition to their use as a store of value, gold and silver can also be used as hedging instruments.
This alternative use is particularly important when agents face uncertainty, while other financial assets
provide low returns and/or high volatility. Table 3 reports the magnitude and significance of the coeffi-
cients associated with the three monetary policy shocks for the S&P500 index and various commodities
for h = 1, i.e. the instantaneous announcement effect.
*** TABLE 3 HERE ***
The first column of Table 3 shows that the instantaneous effects of the monetary policy shocks on the
S&P500 index have the same sign and similar magnitudes as those estimated in Swanson (2017). In the
pre-ZLB period, monetary tightening, through either raising federal funds rate or forward guidance,
causes the stock market index to fall. During the ZLB period, the FG shock has an even larger negative
effect on stock prices, although it is statistically insignificant. Moreover, the LSAP shock has a small
positive impact on the S&P500 index in the impact period.
During the pre-ZLB period, both gold and silver prices increase in response to tightening monetary
policy shocks, whilst the stock market index decreases. These distinct responses highlight the role of
gold and silver as a hedging instrument. This is consistent with the negative estimates for precious
metals found by Hillier et al. (2006). Prices of precious metals are commonly driven up during crisis
times as investors “fly to safety”. From July 2, 2007 to March 9, 2009, the S&P500 stock index lost 55%,
while gold rallied by 40%. However, since the beginning of the ZLB, gold price responds to the two
monetary policy shocks in the same direction as the S&P500 index. This might reflect the fact that the
US stock market and gold share similarity hedging properties against the European sovereign crises.
It is worth recalling that at the time, this was the major source of risk. More precisely, in July 2011, the
Eurozone approved a rescue package to Greece, and in August, European Central Bank (ECB) started
significant purchases of Spanish and Italian sovereign bonds under its Securities Markets Programme.
The easing LSAP policy on August 9, 2011, by the Fed led to a 4.6% gain in S&P500. At the same time,
the gold price also increased by almost 3.5% due to persistent fears about the economic outlook in the
Eurozone. Similarly, in October 2011, as the Bank of England injected £75 billion into its economy, and
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the Eurozone reached a deal on the second Greek bailout package, the gold price steadily increased.
Meanwhile, the S&P500 experienced an increase under a series of Fed easing LSAP policies.
The only statistically significant instantaneous effect occurs with the LSAP shock on the gold price.
In particular, an easing policy (negative shock) leads to a sizable drop in the price of gold. This indicates
that UMP successfully reduced the risk in the economy. With regards to production and agricultural
commodities, while none of their instantaneous response is significant, the magnitude remains positive.
However, our previous structural break test results show significant breaks in these commodity prices
around the quantitative easing event dates.
4.2.2. Longer Lasting Effects
Impulse responses based on local projections enable us to capture the follow-through of these price
responses. We now provide a complete characterization of response paths from commodity prices to
different UMP shocks. More precisely, we estimate the impulse responses for up to 60 days after an
announcement day, i.e. almost 3 months. Table 4 summarizes the estimated impulse responses for all
commodities and their corresponding HAC standard error estimates. We only report the results for
every 5-day interval due to space limitation. Plots of point and interval estimates of these impulse
responses are presented in Figures 2–8.
*** TABLE 4 HERE ***
Asset-Like Commodities
We first present the impulse responses of the S&P500 index in Figure 2 to contrast with those of
precious metals. Before the ZLB period, S&P500 index responds negatively to both monetary policy
shocks, i.e. monetary tightening through either raising federal funds rate or forward guidance. These
negative effects from FFR and FG shocks remain statistically significant up to about 5 weeks and 3
weeks, respectively. During the ZLB period, the longer term dynamic effects of the FG shock are
mostly close to 0 and are insignificant. On the other hand, the LSAP shock has initially a small positive
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impact on the S&P500 index, but the effect becomes negative after 3 weeks. Not only the magnitude of
the response becomes larger in the long-term, it is often statistically significant from 5 weeks onward.
As the LSAP shocks are mostly negative during the ZLB period, representing monetary easing policies,
it causes the stock market to increase in the weeks following the shock. Therefore, prior to the ZLB
period, the two monetary policy measures, FFR and FG, have similar effects on the equity market. In
contrast, during the ZLB period the LSAP shock has much stronger and more long-lasting effect than
the FG shock.
*** FIGURES 2–4 HERE ***
The impulse responses of gold and silver prices are presented in Figures 3 and 4, respectively.
Prior to the ZLB period, the FFR shock does not have any statistically significant effect on gold prices.
Notably, the FG shock always has negative impact on the price of gold in both sub-sample periods.
These results are most likely capturing inflation and dollar hedges. A positive (tightening) FG shock,
higher long-run interest rate, will lead to lower future inflation expectations. This also makes the US
dollar more attractive relative to foreign investments. Therefore, as the demand for inflation and dollar
hedges fall, the price of gold will drop. Such effects are stronger during the ZLB period, and remain
mostly statistically significant for 7-8 weeks after a FG shock.
As for the LSAP shock, an easing policy (negative shock) leads to a sizable drop in the price of gold.
This indicates that quantitative easing policies can successfully reduce the risk in the economy. This
effect becomes statistically significant and peaks at 4-5 weeks after a LSAP shock. At the same time,
the S&P500 index increases in response to an easing LSAP shock in the long-run. This asymmetric
movements suggests that gold can still be used to diversify risk stemming from the equity market
during the ZLB period. Note that the price of gold responds differently to the FG and LSAP shocks
during the ZLB period. Moreover, gold price is more sensitive to FG shocks. An easing monetary
policy could be a combination of both, with the FG shock causing gold price to rise, and the LSAP
shock causing gold price to fall. As a result, the overall effect on gold price depends on the magnitude
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of these shocks. Thus, our results are not inconsistent with the findings of Zhu et al. (2018) that reports
that the return on gold usually increases after a quantitative easing announcement.
The demand for silver as a government reserve or private investment is not as high when com-
pared to gold. The estimated impulse responses of silver prices to various monetary policy shocks are
depicted in Figure 4. These look very similar to those found for gold prices. Prior to ZLB, both the
FFR shock and the FG shock have negative effects on silver prices. The effect of FFR shock is statis-
tically significant 4-5 weeks after a shock, whereas the response to FG shock is mostly insignificant.
Weaker responses to FG shock than gold price indicate that, although silver can also be used to hedge
against inflation risk as a precious metal, gold has a more prominent role. During the ZLB period,
the responses of silver price to both shocks are usually larger than those of gold price, but have less
statistically significant cases. Once again these results highlight how gold and silver can be used as a
store of value and as a hedge against inflation and other financial risks. These results also emphasize
the leading role of gold among precious metals as the preferred commodity hedge.
Production-like Commodities
As pointed out by Hillier et al. (2006), the prices of industrial materials are largely determined by
the state of the economy. Before the global financial crisis, previous studies find that a tightening
shock, typically represented by a rise in interest rate, leads to a reduction in the price of industrial
commodities. However, the effects of UMPs are rarely discussed. We expect that palladium, platinum
and copper prices fall in response to tightening monetary policy shocks both before and after the ZLB.
*** FIGURES 5–7 HERE ***
The impulse responses of palladium, platinum and copper corresponding to the three monetary
policy shocks are presented in Figures 5, 6 and 7, respectively. Prior to the ZLB period, palladium is
much more responsive to the FFR shock than the FG shock. The FG shock does not have a statisti-
cally significant effect on the price of palladium up to 60 days after the shock. This is also the case
for platinum and copper. On the other hand, increasing the federal funds rate leads to a drop in the
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palladium price. This effect is particularly large at around 5 weeks after a FFR shock. Such negative
response is consistent with conventional wisdom when the central bank did not pursue unconventional
monetary policies. A tightening monetary policy slows down economic activity, and prices of produc-
tion materials drop as a result. The prices of platinum and copper also respond negatively to the FFR
shock, although their impulse responses are mostly statistically insignificant. Hammoudeh et al. (2015)
similarly find a persistent reduction in the metal price index as a result of a positive interest rate shock.
During the ZLB period, forward guidance becomes the new monetary policy norm, and accord-
ingly, the FG shock has large negative effect on the prices of palladium and platinum. These effects are
mostly significant 2-5 weeks after a FG shock. Expecting a future increase in the interest rate (as implied
by a positive (tightening) FG shock) decreases prices of production-like commodities. Frankel (2006)
also finds that for a 1 percent increase in the real interest rate is associated with the Thomson Reuters
CoreCommodity CRB index decreasing by 6 percent with a speed of adjustment of 0.16 per year. These
results largely contradicts the findings of Glick and Leduc (2012), who find that easing US monetary
surprises lead to declines in prices of commodities like metals. They argue that LSAP announcements
are likely to involve signaling effects about future economic activity, which leads investors to down-
grade their US economic growth forecasts, and results in a decline in commodity prices. Our results
suggest that in the long run, easing UMPs lead to increased prices of palladium and platinum. Since
such policies are aimed at stimulating the economy, one would expect a future increase in the demand
for production materials. It is important to note that Glick and Leduc (2012) do not examine the long-
run effects of UMP shocks, and hence their results are more comparable to the instantaneous effects,
rather than the long-run impact of such policies.
Copper reacts to the FG and LSAP shocks differently compared with palladium and platinum
during the ZLB period. Although the FG shock has negative effects on copper price for 4-5 weeks,
it reverts to positive at 5 weeks after a FG shock. In addition, none of the effects has any statistical
significance at 5% level. The LSAP shock, on the other hand, does show some significant negative
impact in the mid to long-run.
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Agricultural Commodities
Due to limited availability of agricultural commodity price data, we only analyze cocoa. A few other
agricultural commodities have data that cover part of the announcement period from 1991 to 2015;
we use them for robustness checks in the next section. The impulse responses of coca price to the
monetary policy shocks are depicted in Figure 8.
*** FIGURE 8 HERE ***
The left column of Figure 8 shows that prior to the ZLB period, a positive (tightening) FFR shock
leads to large but mostly insignificant drop in the price of cocoa, while the FG shock doesn’t seem to
have much of an impact. This is largely consistent with the finding of Scrimgeour (2014) that unex-
pected interest rate movements lead to decrease in the prices of agricultural commodities. Alam and
Gilbert (2017) analyze the price dynamics of corn, wheat, oat and soybean, and find that monetary eas-
ing leads to higher commodity prices. Moreover, the authors find that, even before 2003, co-movements
are more pronounced in major agriculture commodities.
The left column of Figure 8 shows that during the ZLB period, the FG shock has negative effects on
the price of cocoa. In particular, the magnitude increases gradually, and becomes statistically significant
roughly 2 months after a FG shock. Bamba and Reed (2004) use monetary supply as a policy instrument
and also find a negative impact on the price of cocoa at the 3-month horizon. On the other hand, the
long-run effect of the LSAP shock on the price of cocoa is positive, although it is smaller in magnitude
than the effect of the FG shock. The price of agricultural commodities are also heavily affected by other
factors that tend to exhibit strong seasonal patterns. Moreover, households’ demand for food products




We implement a wide range of experiments to determine the robustness of our results. The first one
is to use an alternative model specifications when constructing the local projections to estimate the
impulse responses. We consider higher order lags of log yt as additional control variables on the right
hand side of equation (1), and we find them to be mostly insignificant. We also estimate a restricted
model with β0 = 0 and β1 = 1, as these two coefficients are almost always close to 0 and 1, respectively.
In addition, t-test shows that these coefficients are not statistically different from 0 and 1. The impulse
responses obtained from the restricted model are very similar to those shown in the previous section.
These results are available upon request.
Given that different financial markets are closely inter-connected, we introduce the S&P500 index
and VIX as additional control variables to control for potential model mis-specification. We estimate
local projections in two different ways. The first one uses the single-equation model that includes
S&P500 index and the VIX as two additional control variables, which is given by
log yt−1+h = β0 + β1 log yt−1 + β2 log SPt−1 + β3 logVIXt−1
+ φ1,hεFFR,t + φ2,hεFG,t + φ3,hεLSAP,t + ut,h. (2)
A second alternative is to use multi-equation vector autoregression (VAR) model within each sub-
group of commodities. Specifically, we build a VAR system with gold, silver, the S&P500 index and
VIX. We consider another VAR with palladium, platinum, copper, the S&P500 index and VIX.11 This
effectively includes other commodity prices from the same sub-group as control variables when es-
timating the local projections. We find that the impulse responses obtained in these two alternative
models are very similar to the baseline case.
As the identified monetary policy shocks cover a long time period from July 1991 to October 2015,
our previous empirical analyses only use commodity prices that have data available for the entire
sample period. There are a few other commodity price series that are available only after 1996. We
11We do not estimate VAR for cocoa as the estimated impulse response will be the same as the single-equation model for
cocoa.
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conduct the same estimation procedure with this shorter sample. This is especially relevant for agri-
cultural commodities. As a result, we have a shorter pre-ZLB period starting from January 1996 (113
announcements). However, the ZLB period, where UMP shocks operate, is the same as before (55
announcements). We extract daily data on the front month continuation price on corn, soybean and
wheat from Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), and implement local projections using these commodity
prices. Their corresponding impulse responses are tabulated in Tables 3 and 4, and are depicted in
Figures 9–11.
*** FIGURES 9–11 HERE ***
Corn, soybean and wheat prices exhibit similar responses to monetary policy shocks. The corre-
sponding instantaneous responses, found in in Table 3, almost always have the same sign. In particular,
easing monetary policy shocks tend to lead to a price increase in agricultural commodities, except for
the LSAP shock. An easing LSAP shock seems to be viewed more as a signal of a negative future
economic outlook. Hence it leads to drops in all commodity prices on the day of the shock occurrence.
Such differential impacts of the FG and LSAP shocks during the ZLB period, once again highlight the
importance of disentangling the two UMP shocks. In terms of long-lasting effects of various monetary
policy shocks, most of our previous cocoa results carry through to corn, soybean and wheat prices.
Last but not least, we verify that commodity prices are indeed responding to monetary policy
shocks. To do so we consider a counterfactual exercise. We construct shocks from weather data on
days of the FOMCmade announcements. Then we estimate the responses of commodity prices to these
weather shocks. We expect these shocks to be orthogonal to monetary policy shocks, and should not
induce any meaningful changes in commodity prices. This is especially the case for non-agricultural
commodities, where weather does not affect their supply.
Weather data are obtained from the National Centers for Environmental Information website.12
We use daily observations on precipitation, snowfall, maximum and minimum temperature for the
weather station USW00013743 at Washington Reagan National Airport, from 1st January 1991 to 30th
12https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/cdo-web/search
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June 2016. Take the daily minimum temperature as an example. It is regressed against all monthly
dummies to control for seasonality, as well as 50 lags of all 4 time series of daily weather data to control
for autocorrelation and cross-correlation, the residual is then taken as the shock to daily minimum
temperature, denoted as εMIN,t. The maximum temperature shock, εMAX,t, is obtained using a similar
procedure, except that εMIN,t is also added to the list of control variables to ensure orthogonality of
these shocks. The third weather shock we construct is daily precipitation, which is orthogonalized
against both εMIN,t and εMAX,t.
13 Once these 3 weather shocks are computed, we extract their values
on the same set of 213 FOMC announcement dates, and use them in a local projection regression
to estimate the corresponding impulse responses. The correlation between the weather shocks and
monetary policy shocks are very close to zero, and statistically insignificant.
*** FIGURES 12–14 HERE ***
The responses of each commodity prices to the three weather shocks are depicted in Figures 12–14.
The scale on the y-axis has been normalised to [-2, 2] to facilitate comparisons across different panels.
Comparing with the impulse responses to the 3 monetary policy shocks, the weather shocks have
little effect on commodity prices. In addition, almost all the responses are statistically insignificant,
with only a few exceptions. This supports our argument that changes in commodity prices cannot
be attributed to other factors such as weather shocks. Given the high frequency identification of the
monetary policy shocks, it is unlikely that other shocks would occur in such a short time frame and in a
similar fashion. The near-zero responses of commodity prices to the set of weather shocks corroborate
such conjecture.
5. Conclusion
This paper investigates how commodity markets are affected by unconventional monetary policies
implemented by the Federal Reserve of the United States. We use the high frequency identification
13Given the strong seasonality feature of snowfall, it is not used to construct a weather shock here.
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strategy proposed by Swanson (2017) to extract three distinct monetary policy shocks, namely, the
federal funds rate (FFR), the forward guidance (FG) , and the large-scale asset purchase (LSAP) shocks.
In addition to implementing structural break tests and estimating the instantaneous effects, we employ
local projections to estimate impulse responses using daily data. The commodities we analyze belong
to three categories: (1) asset-like commodities (gold and silver), which are commonly used to hedge
various financial risks; (2) production-like commodities (copper, palladium and platinum), which are
commonly used as inputs for industrial production; (3) and finally agricultural commodities (cocoa,
corn, soybean, wheat) that are mainly consumption goods.
We find that asset-like commodities respond to UMP shocks most aggressively. However, the FG
and LSAP shocks tend to have opposite effects. An easing LSAP shock leads to drops in gold and
silver prices, which is consistent with the findings of Glick and Leduc (2012). Relative to an easing
LSAP shock, the equity market responses is opposite to that of gold and silver prices. This suggests
the role of precious metals as hedge against equity market risk. Interestingly, an easing FG shock leads
to increases in the price of gold both before and during the zero lower bound (ZLB) period. This is also
the case for silver during ZLB. There are two possible channels through which such response operates.
The first is the inflation expectation channel. An easing FG shock, represented by lower long-run
interest rate, increases future inflation expectations. Precious metals act as an inflation hedge in this
situation. The second one is the exchange rate channel, where lower long-run interest rate makes the
US dollar less attractive than foreign investments. Precious metals then serve as a US dollar hedge.
For production and agricultural commodities, the effects of UMPs are similar to those associated
with conventional monetary policies prior to the global financial crisis. Nevertheless, the FG shock
appears to be more effective than the LSAP shock in changing commodity prices. We find that in most
cases, the price of production and agricultural commodity rises in response to an easing UMP shock.
One possible explanation for such results is that easing UMPs stimulate economic activity. This lead
to an increased demand for goods. As a result, prices of production and agricultural commodities
rise in the long-run. In this paper we find that different monetary policy shocks differently affect
commodities that capture production, consumer and financial markets. Policymakers can exploit these
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different commodities when evaluating the effectiveness of monetary policy in different sectors of the
economy.
Our analyses on individual commodity prices complement the studies on the effects of UMPS on
financial markets by Glick and Leduc (2012), Amatov and Dorfman (2017) and Swanson (2017). Left
for future research is to determine the relative importance of different structural shocks in the forecast
error variance decomposition of the local projections. The economic turbulence caused by COVID-19
in early 2020 is yet another interesting avenue to study the impact of unconventional monetary policies
in response to this large and negative shock.
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Table 1: Major US unconventional monetary policy (UMP) announcements
Date Event(s) Notes
First LSAP
11/25/2008 FOMC Statement Fed announces purchases of $100 billion in GSE debt and up to $500
billion in mortgage-backed securities (MBS).
12/01/2008 Speech(Austin) FED Chairman Bernanke mentions that the Fed could purchase long-
term Treasuries.
12/16/2008 FOMC Statement Target federal funds rate decreased to between 0 and 0.25%. FOMC
statement first mentions possible purchase of long-term Treasuries.
1/28/2009 FOMC Statement FOMC statement says that it is ready to expand agency debt and MBS
purchases, as well as to purchase long-term Treasuries.
03/18/2009 FOMC Statement FOMC will purchase an additional $750 billion in agency MBS, to
increase its purchases of agency debt by $100 billion, and $300 billion
in long-term Treasuries.
04/29/2009 FOMC Statement The Federal Reserve will purchase a total of up to $1.25 trillion of
agency mortgage-backed securities and up to $200 billion of agency
debt by the end of the year. In addition, the Federal Reserve will buy
up to $300 billion of Treasury securities by autumn.
06/24/2009 FOMC Statement The Fed Reserve will purchase a total of up to $1.25 trillion of agency
MBS and up to $200 billion of agency debt by the end of the year. In
addition, the Federal Reserve will buy up to $300 billion of Treasury
securities by autumn.
08/12/2009 FOMC Statement Fed restate purchase of MBS and agency debt by end-2009 and it is
in the process of buying of Treasury securities.
09/23/2009 FOMC Statement Fed’s purchases of $300 billion of Treasury securities will be com-
pleted by the end of October 2009.
11/04/2009 FOMC Statement The amount of agency debt to be purchased by the Fed reduced to
$175 billion. MBS and agency debt purchases are to be completed by
end-2010Q1.
12/16/2009 FOMC Statement To provide support to mortgage lending and housing markets and
to improve overall conditions in private credit markets, the Fed-
eral Reserve is in the process of purchasing $1.25 trillion of agency
mortgage-backed securities and about $175 billion of agency debt.
01/26/2010 FOMC Statement To provide support to mortgage lending and housing markets and
to improve overall conditions in private credit markets, the Fed-
eral Reserve is in the process of purchasing $1.25 trillion of agency
mortgage-backed securities and about $175 billion of agency debt
03/16/2010 FOMC Statement To provide support to mortgage lending and housing markets and
to improve overall conditions in private credit markets, the Federal
Reserve has been purchasing 1.25 trillion of agency mortgage-backed
securities and about $175 billion of agency debt; those purchases are
nearing completion, and the remaining transactions will be executed
by the end of this month
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04/28/2010 FOMC Statement The Committee will maintain the target range for the federal funds
rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and continues to anticipate that economic
conditions, including low rates of resource utilization, subdued in-
flation trends, and stable inflation expectations, are likely to warrant
exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for an extended pe-
riod.
08/10/2010 FOMC Statement Fed will keep constant its holdings of securities at their current level
by reinvesting principal payments from agency debt and agency MBS
in longer-term Treasury securities. FOMC will continue to roll over




Chairman Bernanke names ”conducting additional purchases of
longer-term securities” as a tool, ”is prepared to provide additional
monetary accommodation through unconventional measures ...”
09/21/2010 FOMC Statement FOMC statement indicated willingness to ”provide additional accom-
modation if needed.”
10/15/2010 Speech (Boston) Chairman Bernanke states the Fed will continue keeping interest
rates low and mentions further quantitative easing.
11/03/2010 FOMC Statement Fed intends to purchase a further $600 billion of longer-term Treasury
securities by the end of 2011Q2, a pace of about $75 billion per month.
12/14/2010 FOMC Statement The Committee intends to purchase $600 billion of longer-term Trea-
sury securities by the end of the second quarter of 2011, a pace of
about $75 billion per month.
01/26/2011 FOMC Statement The Committee is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting prin-
cipal payments from its securities holdings and intends to purchase
$600 billion of longer-term Treasury securities by the end of the sec-
ond quarter of 2011.
03/15/2011 FOMC Statement the Committee is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting prin-
cipal payments from its securities holdings and intends to purchase
$600 billion of longer-term Treasury securities by the end of the sec-
ond quarter of 2011.
04/27/2011 FOMC Statement Committee restate its position of purchasing longer-term Treasury
securities by the current quarter.
06/22/2011 FOMC Statement QE2 finishes: treasury purchases will wrap up at the end of month,
as scheduled; principal payment will continue to be reinvested.
Maturity Extension Program




Fed ChairmanâA˘Z´s remarks left the door open for additional accom-
modation.
09/21/2011 FOMC Statement Fed announced that it would reallocate $400 billion from the short to
long-term Treasuries.
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12/13/2011 FOMC Statement To support a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure that in-
flation, over time, is at levels consistent with the dual mandate, the
Committee decided today to continue its program to extend the aver-
age maturity of its holdings of securities as announced in September.
04/25/2012 FOMC Statement The Committee decided to continue its program to extend the aver-
age maturity of its holdings of securities as announced in September.
06/20/2012 FOMC Statement Maturity extension program extended: The FED will continue to pur-
chase long-term securities and sell short-term securities through the
end of 2012. Purchases/sales will continue at the current pace, about
$45 billion/month.
Third LSAP




Chairman Bernanke hints at QE3: ”The Federal Reserve will provide
additional policy accommodation as needed to promote a stronger
economic recovery and sustained improvement in labor market con-
ditions in a context of price stability.”
09/13/2012 FOMC Statement The Fed will purchase additional agency MBS at a pace of $40 billion
per month.
12/12/2012 FOMC Statement QE3 expanded: the FED will continue to purchase $45 billion of
long-term Treasuries per month but will no longer sterilize purchases
through the sale of short-term treasuries.
Events in 2013–2015
03/20/2013 FOMC Statement FOMC improved its assessment of economic and labour market con-
ditions
05/01/2013 FOMC Statement The Committee decided to continue purchasing additional agency
mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $40 billion per month and
longer-term Treasury securities at a pace of $45 billion per month.
05/22/2013 FOMC Minutes
and Testimony
Fed Chairman remarked about a potential âA˘IJstep-downâA˘I˙ in the
pace of asset purchases.





Fed Chairman remarked about risks to growth and labour market.
07/31/2013 FOMC Statement FOMC the Committee decided to continue purchasing additional
agency mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $40 billion per month
and longer-term Treasury securities at a pace of$45 billion per month.
09/18/2013 FOMC Statement The Committee decided to continue purchasing additional agency
mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $40 billion per month and
longer-term Treasury securities at a pace of $45 billion per month
10/30/2013 FOMC Statement FOMC assessed economic and labour market conditions with opti-
mism.
12/18/2013 FOMC Statement Fed announced a $75 billion decline in the pace of asset purchases
beginning in January.
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01/29/2014 FOMC Statement Fed announced a $10 billion decline in the pace of asset purchases
beginning in February. It will reduce the pace of asset purchases at
future meetings. A ”balanced approachâA˘I˙ will be taken to assess
the policy rate. Current target funds rate will remain âA˘IJwell past
the time that the unemployment rate declines below 6.5%, especially
if inflation continues to run below the Committee’s 2% goal.”
03/19/2014 FOMC Statement Fed announced a $10 billion decline in the pace of asset purchases
beginning in April. The current target funds rate will depend on
âA˘IJa wide range of informationâA˘I˙ and will be maintained ”for a
considerable time after the asset purchase program ends.”
05/30/2014 FOMC Statement Fed announced a $10 billion decline in the pace of asset purchases
beginning in May.
06/18/2014 FOMC Statement Fed announced a $10 billion decline in the pace of asset purchases
beginning in July. Economic conditions may keep policy rate ’below
normal’ levels, even after long-run employment and inflation goals
are reached.
07/30/2014 FOMC Statement Fed announced a $10 billion decline in the pace of asset purchases
beginning in August. Reductions will continue upon labour market
improvement and price stability.
09/17/2014 FOMC Statement Fed announced a $10 billion decline in the pace of asset purchases
beginning in October.
10/29/2014 FOMC Statement Asset purchase program concluded, but principal payments will con-
tinue to be reinvested. Economic activity expanding at a moderate
pace.
12/17/2014 FOMC Statement FOMC announces that, ”it can be patient in beginning to normalize
the stance of monetary policy.”
Note: These are the major announcements by FED between September 2008 to December 2014. Dates,statements and an-
nouncements are sourced from Federal Reserve website on www.federalreserve.gov and reconciled with Dates, statements
are reconciled with Kozicki et al. (2011), Fawley and Neely (2013), Bowman et al. (2015b) and Swanson (2017).
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Figure 1: Three components of US monetary policy shock identified by Swanson (2017)












Table 2: Structural break dates around policy events from July 1, 2008 to June 30, 2016




Apr 29, 10(+1) Nov 25, 09 Apr 23, 09(-6) May 20, 10 Jul 13, 09
Aug 18, 11 Oct 13, 10(-2) Aug 23, 11(-3) Aug 08, 11(-1) Jul 20, 11
Jun 27, 12(+1) Aug 15, 11(+6) Nov 20, 12 Jun 29, 12 Jun 01, 12
Jan 03, 14 Jul 05, 12 Jun 03, 13 May 28, 13(+6) May 30, 13
Jul 29, 15 May 22, 13(0) Nov 06, 14 Mar 14, 14(-5) Jul 31, 14(+1)
Lee & Strch
(2003)
Aug 10, 10(0) Aug 11, 11(+2) Dec 07, 10(-7) Apr 16, 09 Mar 19, 09(+1)




Sep 09, 09 Nov 04, 09(0) Apr 06, 10 Nov 16, 09 Dec 29, 09
Nov 22, 10 Jun 22, 11(0) Jun 20, 11(-2) Sep 26, 11(+5) Mar 18, 11(+3)
Feb 03, 12 Apr 15, 13 Apr 15, 13 Jun 13, 13(-6) Apr 20, 15




Jun 01, 12 Jul 05, 11 Feb 11, 11 Nov 25, 10 Aug 01, 11
Nov 05, 14(+7) Apr 10, 13 Mar 28, 13 Aug 16, 12(-6) Feb 04, 14(+6)




Apr 17, 09 May 18, 09 Apr 22, 09(-7) Jan 05, 09 Oct 19, 08
Feb 02, 10(+7) Mar 12, 10(-4) Feb 15, 10 Dec 18, 09(+2) Jul 23, 10
Nov 19, 10 Jan 04, 11 Jan 09, 11 Dec 19, 11(+6) Jan 13, 12
Nov 20, 12 Jun 27, 12(+7) Jun 20, 12(0) Sep 17, 13(0) Aug 29, 13
Oct 17, 13 Dec 17, 14(0) Jun 09, 13 Jun 29, 15 Dec 16, 14(-1)
Lee & Strch
(2003)
Apr 23, 09(-6) Jul 16, 09 Mar 3, 11 Jul 12, 13 Aug 07, 08




Sep 11, 09 Sep 11, 09 Sep 11, 09 Nov 02, 08 Oct 30, 08
Nov 22, 10 Sep 22, 11(+1) Nov 24, 10 Aug 28, 10(+) Jul 28, 10
Mar 18, 13(-2) Sep 16, 13(-2) May 01, 12(+6) Dec 30, 11 Jul 08, 12
Jan 13, 15 Apr 21, 15 Jul 15, 13(+4) May 07, 13(+6) Oct 15, 13
Sep 28, 14 Sep 17, 14 Feb 23, 15
Lums. &
Papell(1997)
Jul 29, 11 Jan 27, 10(0) Aug 29, 12 Sep 10, 09 Feb 17, 09
Jul 31, 13(0) Sep 06, 11 Nov 12, 13 Jul 15, 12 Jul 16, 12
Note: Coloured are the break dates that fell within a week of an event with days prior and post events (+-Days) in the
parentheses. Red for QE1, Blue for QE2 and maturity extension, Orange for QE3 and Green for other dates from May
2013 to April 2015. Lee & Strch (2003) and Lums. & Papell (1997) stand for Lee and Strazicich (2003) and Lumsdaine
and Papell (1997), respectively. Since all the years are post 2000, to conserve space we use only last two digits to
represent the year.
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Table 3: The instantaneous effects of monetary policy shocks
Shock S&P500 Gold Silver Palla Plat Copper Cocoa Corn Soybean Wheat
Pre-crisis (Jul.1991–Dec.2008)
FFR -0.43∗∗ 0.07 0.09 -0.47 -0.03 -0.04 -0.21 -0.26 -0.15 -0.28
(0.19) (0.07) (0.12) (0.35) (0.14) (0.12) (0.14) (0.19) (0.12) (0.17)
FG -0.33∗∗ 0.04 0.17 0.17 0.06 -0.11 -0.07 -0.49∗∗ -0.25∗ -0.44∗∗
(0.16) (0.09) (0.14) (0.18) (0.08) (0.14) (0.19) (0.20) (0.13) (0.20)
Post-crisis (Jan.2009–Oct.2015)
FG -0.47 -0.15 0.30 0.13 0.20 0.38 0.02 -0.60∗∗ -0.34 -0.94∗∗
(0.42) (0.19) (0.34) (0.27) (0.15) (0.29) (0.23) (0.28) (0.31) (0.37)
LSAP 0.10 0.21∗∗ 0.22 0.19 0.09 0.23 0.14 0.19 -0.00 0.62∗∗∗
(0.21) (0.10) (0.21) (0.12) (0.12) (0.17) (0.13) (0.23) (0.24) (0.18)
Note: HAC standard errors are in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Data
on corn, soybean and wheat only start from January 1996.
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Table 4: Local Projections
S&P500 index Gold price
Pre-ZLB ZLB Pre-ZLB ZLB
Day FFR Shock FG Shock FG Shock LASP Shock FFR Shock FG Shock FG Shock LASP Shock
0
-0.43∗∗ -0.33∗∗ -0.47 0.10 0.07 0.03 -0.15 0.21∗∗
(0.19) (0.16) (0.42) (0.21) (0.07) (0.09) (0.19) (0.10)
5
-0.43∗∗ -0.51∗∗∗ -0.46 0.22 -0.08 -0.07 -1.08∗∗ 0.11
(0.21) (0.19) (0.58) (0.40) (0.24) (0.24) (0.54) (0.33)
10
-0.96∗∗∗ -0.55∗∗ -0.14 0.18 -0.04 -0.26 -2.10∗∗∗ 0.42
(0.22) (0.22) (0.56) (0.46) (0.31) (0.21) (0.73) (0.40)
15
-1.11∗∗∗ -0.37 -0.37 0.18 -0.13 -0.44∗ -2.26∗∗∗ 1.17∗∗
(0.34) (0.25) (0.51) (0.51) (0.31) (0.26) (0.56) (0.58)
20
-1.17∗∗∗ -0.18 -0.11 -0.64 0.05 -0.58∗∗ -2.51∗∗∗ 1.49∗∗∗
(0.41) (0.34) (0.42) (0.48) (0.31) (0.24) (0.79) (0.57)
25
-1.03∗∗ 0.15 -0.07 -0.56 -0.41 -0.74∗∗∗ -2.25∗∗∗ 1.32∗∗∗
(0.45) (0.40) (0.47) (0.54) (0.40) (0.28) (0.78) (0.46)
30
-0.99 -0.14 0.13 -1.11∗ -0.37 -0.79∗∗ -2.06∗∗∗ 0.95∗
(0.63) (0.50) (0.69) (0.57) (0.50) (0.38) (0.67) (0.56)
35
-0.65 -0.09 0.08 -1.55∗∗∗ -0.40 -0.87∗∗ -1.65∗∗ 0.57
(0.49) (0.48) (0.59) (0.58) (0.48) (0.36) (0.77) (0.43)
40
-0.54 0.11 0.04 -1.09∗∗ -0.72 -0.65 -1.98∗∗ 1.02∗∗
(0.54) (0.58) (0.55) (0.50) (0.53) (0.41) (0.81) (0.44)
45
-0.74 0.14 -0.63 -1.07∗ -0.32 -0.97∗∗ -1.66 0.84
(0.61) (0.59) (0.77) (0.61) (0.40) (0.44) (0.94) (0.53)
50
-0.45 0.18 -0.65 -1.38∗∗∗ -0.17 -0.98∗∗∗ -1.18 0.39
(0.59) (0.71) (0.91) (0.53) (0.37) (0.36) (1.07) (0.72)
55
-0.15 0.07 0.12 -1.63∗∗∗ -0.00 -0.93∗∗∗ -0.35 0.73
(0.68) (0.82) (1.11) (0.54) (0.42) (0.30) (0.99) (0.63)
60
-0.33 0.02 0.06 -1.48∗∗ -0.00 -0.76∗∗ 0.03 0.50
(0.62) (0.71) (1.24) (0.65) (0.48) (0.30) (0.90) (0.68)
Note: HAC standard errors are in parentheses. ** indicates significance at 0.05.
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Silver price Palladium Price
Pre-ZLB ZLB Pre-ZLB ZLB
Day FFR Shock FG Shock FG Shock LASP Shock FFR Shock FG Shock FG Shock LASP Shock
0
0.09 0.17 0.30 0.22 -0.47 0.17 0.13 0.19
(0.12) (0.14) (0.34) (0.21) (0.35) (0.18) (0.27) (0.12)
5
-0.29 -0.32 -1.38 0.32 -0.49 0.26 -1.04 0.27
(0.35) (0.36) (1.19) (0.81) (0.25) (0.21) (0.83) (0.64)
10
-0.48 -0.43 -3.18∗∗ 1.36 -1.71∗∗ 0.18 -2.37∗ 1.05
(0.54) (0.34) (1.55) (0.83) (0.52) (0.40) (1.38) (0.82)
15
-0.62 -0.31 -3.91∗∗∗ 2.34∗∗∗ -1.25 0.08 -4.19∗∗ 1.26∗
(0.49) (0.39) (1.28) (0.88) (0.76) (0.61) (1.66) (0.74)
20
-0.84∗ -0.35 -3.50∗∗ 2.36∗∗ -1.45 0.33 -3.59∗ 0.66
(0.44) (0.36) (1.40) (0.94) (0.91) (0.57) (1.86) (1.02)
25
-1.20∗∗ -0.34 -3.18∗∗ 2.18∗∗ -2.43∗∗ 0.85 -2.78 0.57
(0.56) (0.56) (1.55) (0.99) (1.19) (0.63) (1.72) (0.91)
30
-1.53∗ -0.27 -2.22 1.05 -2.34∗ 1.75∗∗ -1.80 0.58
(0.85) (0.68) (1.60) (1.06) (1.37) (0.83) (1.75) (0.98)
35
-1.50∗ -0.46 -2.04 0.23 -1.14 1.44∗ -1.29 -0.51
(0.85) (0.78) (1.62) (0.75) (1.09) (0.86) (1.61) (0.77)
40
-1.72∗ -0.03 -2.69 1.27 -0.56 1.26 -2.12 1.26
(0.99) (0.97) (1.85) (0.98) (1.21) (1.03) (1.73) (0.92)
45
-1.22 0.69 -2.33 0.98 -0.30 1.14 -0.94 1.62
(0.76) (0.98) (1.77) (1.34) (1.11) (1.04) (1.51) (1.05)
50
-0.89 -0.72 -1.08 -0.05 -0.02 1.51 -1.43 1.50
(0.66) (1.03) (1.88) (1.85) (1.13) (1.16) (2.05) (1.29)
55
-0.70 -0.70 0.30 -0.26 0.09 1.86 -0.79 0.92
(0.78) (0.70) (1.83) (1.61) (1.25) (1.18) (1.99) (0.99)
60
-0.65 -0.74 1.18 -0.02 0.46 1.79 0.51 -0.04
(0.88) (0.63) (1.90) (1.37) (1.32) (1.10) (2.05) (1.06)
Note: HAC standard errors are in parentheses. ** indicates significance at 0.05.
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Platinum price Copper Price
Pre-ZLB ZLB Pre-ZLB ZLB
Day FFR Shock FG Shock FG Shock LASP Shock FFR Shock FG Shock FG Shock LASP Shock
0
-0.03 0.06 0.20 0.09 -0.04 -0.11 0.38 0.23
(0.14) (0.08) (0.15) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.29) (0.18)
5
-0.28 0.10 -0.83 -0.20 -0.03 -0.29 -0.73 0.63
(0.26) (0.19) (0.84) (0.65) (0.24) (0.30) (0.92) (0.61)
10
-0.69 -0.05 -2.14∗ 0.44 -0.03 -0.56 -1.50 0.78
(0.51) (0.31) (1.18) (0.90) (0.40) (0.38) (1.21) (0.96)
15
-1.05 -0.24 -2.75∗∗∗ 0.37 -0.31 -0.05 -0.94 -0.77
(0.78) (0.44) (1.04) (0.88) (0.56) (0.61) (1.23) (1.03)
20
-1.25 0.07 -2.98∗∗ 0.13 -0.68 -0.06 -0.60 -1.52
(0.90) (0.47) (1.35) (1.13) (0.61) (0.71) (1.39) (1.14)
25
-1.78∗ 0.13 -2.48∗ 0.33 -0.51 0.33 -0.05 -0.63
(1.05) (0.45) (1.42) (0.91) (0.72) (0.72) (1.34) (0.86)
30
-1.97∗ 0.42 -1.78 0.41 -0.60 0.29 0.78 -0.92
(1.18) (0.54) (1.24) (0.63) (0.90) (0.68) (1.57) (0.85)
35
-1.40 0.08 -0.95 -0.29 -0.42 0.48 0.60 -1.19
(1.01) (0.52) (1.28) (0.70) (0.79) (0.73) (1.39) (0.79)
40
-1.17 -0.20 -1.05 0.61 -0.24 0.72 0.79 -0.12
(1.02) (0.64) (1.24) (0.85) (0.82) (0.67) (1.47) (0.85)
45
-0.87 -0.32 -0.49 0.40 -0.37 0.69 1.76 -0.50
(1.00) (0.58) (1.22) (1.06) (0.93) (0.70) (1.16) (0.98)
50
-0.59 -0.32 -0.17 -0.40 -0.29 0.26 0.96 -1.24
(1.08) (0.60) (1.31) (1.35) (1.06) (0.75) (1.24) (0.99)
55
-0.75 -0.29 0.28 -0.21 -0.48 0.38 1.60 -1.23
(1.28) (0.58) (1.34) (1.42) (1.19) (0.78) (1.25) (0.89)
60
-0.51 -0.09 0.75 -0.82 -0.52 0.40 1.36 -1.48∗
(1.29) (0.63) (1.55) (1.24) (1.28) (0.73) (1.21) (0.89)
Note: HAC standard errors are in parentheses. ** indicates significance at 0.05.
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Cocoa price Corn Price (Jan.1996–Oct.2015)
Pre-ZLB ZLB Pre-ZLB ZLB
Day FFR Shock FG Shock FG Shock LASP Shock FFR Shock FG Shock FG Shock LASP Shock
0
-0.22 -0.07 0.02 0.14 -0.26 -0.49∗∗ -0.61∗∗ 0.19
(0.14) (0.19) (0.23) (0.13) (0.19) (0.20) (0.28) (0.23)
5
-0.56∗ -0.40 -0.27 -0.44 0.42 -0.12 -1.59*** 0.31
(0.32) (0.34) (0.52) (0.45) (0.40) (0.35) (0.45) (0.29)
10
-0.64 -0.48 -0.53 -0.27 0.49 0.13 -1.82∗ 0.44
(0.61) (0.47) (0.81) (0.50) (0.50) (0.56) (1.00) (0.72)
15
-0.73 -0.12 -0.52 -0.09 0.39 0.30 -1.93 0.12
(0.73) (0.61) (0.83) (0.53) (0.62) (0.53) (0.13) (0.89)
20
-1.16 0.07 -0.99 0.61 0.70 0.39 -1.97 0.78
(0.78) (0.69) (1.01) (0.60) (0.79) (0.63) (1.50) (0.96)
25
-1.76∗∗ 0.34 -0.68 1.43∗ 0.15 0.56 -2.72 -0.22
(0.84) (0.74) (1.26) (0.84) (0.79) (0.47) (1.75) (1.36)
30
-1.98∗ 0.20 -0.78 1.48∗ 0.52 0.48 -2.48 -0.37
(1.14) (0.94) (1.45) (0.89) (0.83) (0.49) (1.54) (1.73)
35
-1.74 0.06 -0.93 1.08 0.27 0.86 -1.39 -0.40
(1.22) (0.97) (1.31) (0.85) (1.11) (0.58) (1.75) (1.67)
40
-1.51 0.07 -1.84 1.98∗∗ 0.53 0.44 -1.12 -1.35
(1.42) (1.04) (1.20) (0.89) (0.87) (0.66) (1.90) (1.58)
45
-0.94 -0.23 -2.23∗ 2.04∗∗ 0.14 0.78 -1.37 -1.14
(1.14) (1.01) (1.18) (0.87) (0.89) (0.76) (2.19) (1.42)
50
-0.88 0.16 -2.97∗∗∗ 1.70 0.28 0.43 -1.57 -0.95
(0.99) (0.95) (1.11) (1.29) (0.86) (0.66) (2.35) (1.39)
55
-0.53 0.07 -4.15∗∗∗ 2.03 0.18 1.19∗ -2.32 -0.98
(0.91) (0.99) (1.34) (1.63) (1.07) (0.62) (2.35) (1.42)
60
-0.95 0.15 -3.35∗∗∗ 1.43 -0.38 1.45∗ -2.40 -0.78
(1.17) (0.92) (1.25) (1.52) (1.40) (0.75) (2.67) (1.42)
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ** indicates significance at 0.05.
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Soybean price (Jan.1996–Oct.2015) Wheat Price (Jan.1996–Oct.2015)
Pre-ZLB ZLB Pre-ZLB ZLB
Day FFR Shock FG Shock FG Shock LASP Shock FFR Shock FG Shock FG Shock LASP Shock
0
-0.15 -0.25∗ -0.34 -0.00 -0.28 -0.44∗∗ -0.94∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.20) (0.31) (0.18) (0.17) (0.20) (0.37) (0.18)
5
0.11 -0.29 -0.47 -0.15 -0.01 -0.67 -1.31∗∗ 0.39
(0.21) (0.32) (0.73) (0.59) (0.29) (0.41) (0.59) (0.33)
10
-0.07 -0.39 -0.48 0.59 -0.69 -1.12∗∗ -1.12 0.58
(0.47) (0.49) (1.02) (0.73) (0.58) (0.55) (1.67) (1.02)
15
-0.47 -0.22 -1.12 0.17 -0.89 -0.82 -1.37 -0.41
(0.61) (0.51) (0.96) (0.97) (0.85) (0.68) (1.27) (0.88)
20
-0.72 -0.18 -1.73 -0.48 -0.16 -0.94 -0.74 0.42
(0.68) (0.65) (1.11) (0.90) (0.87) (0.70) (1.47) (1.17)
25
-1.11 -0.02 -1.45 -1.39 -0.17 -1.00 0.03 -0.10
(0.79) (0.59) (1.20) (1.06) (0.97) (0.66) (1.91) (1.42)
30
-1.04 0.30 -1.29 -1.40 -0.34 -0.73 0.06 -0.32
(0.87) (0.72) (1.03) (0.87) (1.51) (0.72) (1.87) (1.55)
35
-1.12 0.63 -0.54 -0.93 -0.19 -0.98 1.39 -0.22
(1.02) (0.72) (1.19) (0.99) (1.49) (0.71) (2.12) (1.51)
40
-0.52 0.08 -0.11 -2.27∗∗ 0.08 -0.38 1.50 -1.15
(0.68) (0.76) (1.21) (1.06) (1.49) (0.78) (1.94) (1.38)
45
-1.01 0.17 -0.44 -2.18∗∗ -0.11 -0.25 0.82 -1.39
(0.65) (0.88) (1.10) (1.08) (1.72) (0.90) (2.17) (1.15)
50
-0.50 -0.45 -0.92 -2.10∗∗ 0.19 -0.76 -0.09 -0.32
(0.64) (0.83) (1.33) (1.04) (1.39) (0.72) (2.32) (1.23)
55
-0.32 0.35 -0.75 -2.24∗ 0.19 -0.67 -0.12 -1.07
(0.66) (0.79) (1.48) (1.34) (1.63) (0.75) (2.38) (1.30)
60
-0.28 0.07 -1.43 -2.21 0.31 -1.26 0.45 -1.64
(0.71) (0.85) (1.60) (1.37) (1.53) (0.64) (2.58) (1.31)
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ** indicates significance at 0.05.
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Figure 2: Response of S&P500 index to the three components of US monetary policy shock





























Figure 3: Response of gold price to the three components of US monetary policy shock




























Figure 4: Response of silver price to the three components of US monetary policy shock





























Figure 5: Response of palladium price to the three components of US monetary policy shock






























Figure 6: Response of platinum price to the three components of US monetary policy shock































Figure 7: Response of copper price to the three components of US monetary policy shock




























Figure 8: Response of cocoa price to the three components of US monetary policy shock





























Figure 9: Response of corn price to the three components of US monetary policy shock
(from January 1996 to October 2015)






























Figure 10: Response of soybean price to the three components of US monetary policy shock
(from January 1996 to October 2015)






























Figure 11: Response of wheat price to the three components of US monetary policy shock
(from January 1996 to October 2015)
































Figure 12: Response of commodity prices to high temperature shock











































Figure 13: Response of commodity prices to low temperature shock











































Figure 14: Response of commodity prices to precipitation shock
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